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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
(HEARD OCTOBER 11, 2017, AT KNOXVILLE) 
 
Darry Osborne ) Docket No.  2016-02-0562 
 ) 
v. ) State File No.  97626-2016 
 ) 
Starrun, Inc., et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’  ) 
Compensation Claims, ) 
Brian K. Addington, Judge ) 
 
Affirmed and Remanded - Filed November 8, 2017 
 
The employee, a truck driver, sustained serious injuries when he fell from a flatbed trailer 
while in the process of tarping his load.  His employer did not have workers’ 
compensation insurance.  The employee initiated claims for workers’ compensation 
benefits against the employer, the transportation broker that contracted to transport the 
load, and the manufacturer of the materials loaded on the trailer, asserting the broker and 
manufacturer were statutory employers.  Following an expedited hearing, the trial court 
determined the employee was unlikely to prevail at trial in establishing that either the 
broker or the manufacturer were statutory employers as contemplated in Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-113 (2017) and denied benefits.  The employee has appealed the 
trial court’s determination that the manufacturer is not a statutory employer.  We affirm 
the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings as may be necessary. 
 
Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 
Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
 
Dan Beiger, Bristol, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, Darry Osborne 
 
Eric Shen, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, KPS Global 
 
Kevin W. Washburn, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Meadow Lark 
Agency, Inc. 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
    
 Starrun, Inc. (“Employer”), is a motor carrier headquartered in Bluff City, 
Tennessee that employed less than five persons at the time of the October 21, 2016 
accident giving rise to this claim.  Consequently, Employer was not required to carry 
workers’ compensation insurance at the time of the accident and did not have coverage in 
place.  
 
Darry Osborne (“Employee”), a sixty-nine-year-old resident of Richland, Virginia, 
was hired by Employer as a commercial truck driver approximately one month before 
being seriously injured on October 21, 2016.  On that date, he traveled to Employer’s 
facility in Bluff City, Tennessee, where Employer provided an “18-wheeler” and flatbed 
trailer with the equipment necessary to complete an assignment that required him to pick 
up a load of refrigeration panels at KPS Global (“KPS”) in Piney Flats, Tennessee, and 
deliver the load to KPS’s customer in East Liverpool, Ohio.  KPS manufactures walk-in 
coolers and freezers and ships its products in panels from its Piney Flats facility either 
through coordination with transportation brokers who contract with motor carriers for the 
loads to be transported, or through coordination with its customers who arrange for the 
transport of KPS’s products themselves.  Meadow Lark Agency, Inc. (“Meadow Lark”), 
is the transportation broker with whom KPS entered into a “Supply Agreement” to 
transport the load Employee was in the process of tarping when the accident occurred.  
Employee filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits against Employer, KPS, and 
Meadow Lark, contending the latter two were statutory employers from whom he could 
recover workers’ compensation benefits as contemplated in Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-113.  
 
 On the day of the accident, Employer provided the documents needed in 
connection with Employee’s assignment and instructed him where to pick up the load.  
Employee testified that Employer explained “the routine that [he] was show[n] to take 
and bring the truck into [KPS’s facilities].”  Upon his arrival at KPS, he parked in a 
“holding area” and provided his documentation to a KPS employee before being 
instructed to back into one of two loading docks when a dock became available.  Once he 
backed his truck into the loading dock, a KPS employee loaded panels onto the flatbed 
trailer with the assistance of a forklift.  After the panels were loaded and secured, the 
forklift operator lifted the tarp that Employee brought with him and placed it on the top of 
the load.  Although the weight of the tarp was disputed, Employee estimated the tarp 
weighed “about 500 pounds.”  He testified that KPS’s forklift operator did not put the 
tarp over the load; rather, “[h]e put it on top of the load, and I rolled it out and put it over 
the load myself.”  He acknowledged “[i]t was my duty to put the tarp over the load” and 
testified he “went on top and rolled [his] tarp out and was laying it down over the sides to 
bungee it down” when a KPS employee told him, “if [he] didn’t mind, to pull it on 
outside,” adding “there were four trucks behind [him].” 
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 Employee testified that once he pulled outside the covered loading area “when the 
wind got in under my tarp, it almost slid it off my load.  So I parked to where I could 
bungee cord it down, and that’s when the accident happened.”  He stated he was still on 
KPS’s property at the time of the fall.  Describing how the accident occurred, he said “as 
I went to pull this tarp, my feet come [sic] out from under me, and I went over the front 
down to the catwalk,” which he described as “a platform on the back of the truck that you 
can walk on.”  He stated he fell “about ten feet” and landed “facedown on the catwalk.”  
He was transported by ambulance to Bristol Regional Medical Center and diagnosed as 
having suffered a broken leg, broken vertebrae, broken ribs, and a neck injury.  There is 
no dispute that Employee suffered these injuries as a result of his work-related accident. 
 
  The shipping supervisor for KPS, Kevin Bennett, testified that KPS used one of 
five brokers to ship its products from the Piney Flats facility, unless its customers 
arranged to pick up products themselves.  He testified that when a broker is used, KPS 
sends a schedule with a pickup date and a delivery date to the brokers and “[i]t is their 
responsibility to procure equipment to ship the load.”  He testified Meadow Lark was the 
broker that agreed to handle the shipment for this job.  The contract between Meadow 
Lark and Employer identified the required equipment for this job to include a flatbed 
trailer and an “8FT” tarp.  Mr. Bennett testified KPS does not hire drivers and does not 
handle any of the actual shipping of its products.  He described the loading process and 
the instructions given to drivers upon their arrival at KPS’s facility, stating the process is 
the same regardless of whether a broker is used or a customer arranges the shipping. 
 
Mr. Bennett testified that KPS had a tarping machine, but that it wasn’t being used 
because of complaints that the machine had been tearing tarps.  He further testified that 
once KPS performs a final inspection of the load, a check-off sheet is signed and the 
driver is given a final bill of lading, “signs for it, and then he leaves.”  He testified the 
“final approval” by KPS is done before tarping and acknowledged that the final 
inspection does not include whether the load is properly tarped or even tarped at all.  He 
agreed that KPS’s employees have control over the loading of the products and that 
KPS’s employees tell the drivers where to park to tarp their loads.  
 
    Following an expedited hearing, the trial court concluded that Employee had not 
presented sufficient evidence to establish that KPS or Meadow Lark was his statutory 
employer on the date of injury, “and thus [he was] not likely to prevail at a hearing on the 
merits on this issue.”  Employee has appealed only the trial court’s determination as to 
KPS, asserting the trial court erred in concluding KPS did not meet the definition of a 
statutory employer. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the 
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  
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See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2017) (“There shall be a presumption that the 
findings and conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the 
preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.”).  However, we review questions of law de 
novo with no presumption of correctness.  See Am. Mining Ins. Co. v. Campbell, No. 
M2015-01478-SC-R3-WC, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 907, at *18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel 
Dec. 9, 2016) (“A trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo upon the record 
with no presumption of correctness.”).  Moreover, the interpretation and application of 
statutes and regulations concern issues of law, which we review de novo with no 
presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court’s findings.  See Seiber v. Reeves 
Logging, 284 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tenn. 2009); Hadzic v. Averitt Express, No. 2014-02-
0064, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App Bd. LEXIS 14, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 
May 18, 2015). 
 
Analysis 
  
 “Under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee injured in an 
accident while in the course and scope of employment is generally limited to recovering 
workers’ compensation benefits from the employer.”  Fayette Janitorial Servs. v. Kellogg 
USA, Inc., No. W2011-01759-COA-R-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Feb. 4, 2013); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103 (2017).  However, the Act provides that 
a principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor may be required to pay 
workers’ compensation benefits to an injured worker employed by a subcontractor under 
certain circumstances: 
 
A principal contractor, intermediate contractor or subcontractor shall be 
liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of 
any of the subcontractors of the principal contractor, intermediate 
contractor or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the 
contract to the same extent as the immediate employer. 
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a). 
 
 These provisions have been a part of the Act since its inception in 1919.  See 1919 
Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 123 § 15.  Their purpose is to protect injured employees from 
irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors: 
 
In enacting Section 50-6-113, the Legislature sought “to protect employees 
of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability 
on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within his 
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and 
insist upon appropriate compensation for their workers.”  Section 50-6-113 
“operates by passing along to upstream contractors the responsibility either 
to require their immediate contractors or subcontractors to provide workers’ 
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compensation coverage to their own employees or to be responsible for the 
coverage themselves.”  Section 50-6-113 is said to deem such a principal 
contractor to be the injured employee’s “statutory employer.” 
 
Blackwell v. Comanche Constr., Inc., No. W2012-01309-COA-R9-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 251, at *13-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2013) (citations omitted).  
 
In the instant case, Employee asserts that KPS is his “statutory employer.”  He 
bases this assertion upon the premise that KPS meets at least one of the tests set out in 
Lindsey v. Trinity Communications, Inc., 275 S.W.3d 411 (Tenn. 2009) for determining 
whether an entity is a principal contractor.  In Lindsey, the Supreme Court stated that 
“[g]enerally, a company is considered a principal contractor if: (1) the company 
undertakes work for an entity other than itself; (2) the company retains the right of 
control over the conduct of the work and subcontractor’s employees; or (3) the work 
being performed by a subcontractor’s employees is part of the regular business of the 
company or is the same type of work usually performed by the company’s employees.”  
Id. at 421 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Employee identified three issues in his notice of appeal, asserting that the 
transporting of KPS’s product was part of its business, that tarping the loads was part of 
KPS’s business, and that KPS controlled the tarping process.  However, these issues were 
combined into a single issue in Employee’s brief: “[t]he issue is whether the work 
performed by [Employee] when he was injured is part of the regular business of KPS.”  
Thus, Employee focuses on Lindsey’s third test under which a company may be 
determined to be a principal contractor.   
 
  The parties have correctly perceived the dispositive issue to be whether KPS is 
Employee’s statutory employer; however, none of the parties addressed in the trial court 
or on appeal whether Employee was injured “while in the employ of any of the 
subcontractors of the principal contractor, intermediate contractor or subcontractor . . . .” 
Instead, they focused on another requirement of section 50-6-113(a), which is whether 
KPS is “[a] principal contractor, intermediate contractor or subcontractor . . . .”1  
 
In arguing that tarping is part of the regular business of KPS, Employee contends 
the trial court conflates two separate features of transportation, that is, loading products 
for shipment and the actual movement of products once they are loaded.  He argues that 
                                                 
1 For section 50-6-113(a) to be applicable, there must be a finding that the immediate employer, here, 
Starrun, Inc., was a subcontractor of KPS or Meadow Lark.  See Blackwell, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 251, 
at *20 (holding it was necessary for the court to determine whether the injured employee was employed 
by a subcontractor before it could analyze whether the alleged principal contractor was the statutory 
employer of the injured employee).  Here, we cannot discern from the record whether the parties 
presumed that Employer was a subcontractor of KPS or Meadow Lark, and we express no opinion on that 
issue. 
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“[w]hile KPS employees may not typically drive its product from Point A to Point B, the 
evidence proves that loading the product and securing the load is the type of work usually 
performed or assisted by the company’s employees.”  Employee argues the trial court 
erroneously focused on the transportation of the product in question “when it should have 
focused on loading the product.”  Employee’s argument necessarily assumes that tarping 
is part of the loading process.  
 
The uncontradicted testimony from Employee and KPS’s witnesses reflects that, 
while KPS did load the panels onto the trailer, the tarping of the load was a separate 
process.  KPS’s shipping supervisor testified the “final approval” by KPS is done before 
tarping, and he acknowledged that the final inspection does not include whether the load 
is properly tarped or even tarped at all.  KPS required the loads to be tarped to protect the 
product, but Employee agreed he was responsible for the tarping process.  Although a 
KPS employee placed the tarp on top of the load, Employee testified that KPS’s forklift 
operator did not put the tarp over the load; rather, “[h]e put it on top of the load, and I 
rolled it out and put it over the load myself.”  He acknowledged “[i]t was my duty to put 
the tarp over the load,” and he testified he “went on top and rolled my tarp out and was 
laying it down over the sides to bungee it down” when he was asked by a KPS employee 
to move his truck outside the covered loading area.   
 
In short, although KPS required that loads be tarped to protect the products, there 
is insufficient evidence to find that the actual tarping process was part of the regular 
business of KPS or the type of work usually performed by KPS’s employees.  Moreover, 
the evidence of the extent of the control KPS exercised over the process does not 
preponderate against the trial court’s determination that “[s]uch ‘control’ is not what the 
statute envisioned for a statutory employer.”   
 
Conclusion 
 
At this stage of the proceedings, the evidence does not preponderate against the 
trial court’s determination that KPS was not Employee’s statutory employer at the time of 
the accident.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings as may be necessary. 
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